TRACING
THE PATH TO INCLUSIVE EDUCATION:
An Update to Gain A Prospective Of Legal Precedent
Frank Oquendo, M.Ed., M.S.
Introduction
The purpose of this article is an attempt to follow the complex evolution
of inclusion law leading us to "the state of inclusion" where
we find ourselves today. In 1975, dissatisfied with progress being made
under earlier enactments, the U. S. Congress passed the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act. Previous to the passage of this Act, the
Supreme Court noted that many disabled children suffer under one of two
equally ineffective approaches to their educational needs: either they
were excluded from public education, or they were deposited in regular
education classrooms with no assistance (Hudson v. Rowley, 1982). The
judiciary has since played a major role in shaping the course of inclusion
law (Sharp & Pitasky, 2002). In some cases the courts reversed previous
decisions creating serious questions as to what direction will be taken
in the future.
It may be important to first discuss the history of The Education for
Handicapped Law Report, (EHLR). The EHLR was first published in 1979.
Twelve years later, LRP Publications, changed the name of this biweekly
report to reflect the growing sensitivity within the special education
community toward the use of person-first language. Consequently, with
the first issue of Volume 18 in October 1991, the EHLR officially became
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report, (IDELR). IDELR
is an up-to-date, loose-leaf reporting service designed to meet the needs
of the special education community, including attorneys, advocates, administrators,
teachers and service providers, by compiling and up dating relevant federal
statutes and regulations, and combining these with cases, rulings and
interpretations. IDELR includes complete text of Individuals with Disability
Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 implementing regulations, Americans
with Disability Act, (ADA), Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),
U.S. Education Department General Administrative Regulations (EDGAR),
U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights (OCR) with regular
up dates to these statues and regulations (LPR Publications, 2001).
Perhaps more importantly, IDELR provides complete text, with concise
summaries of rulings and memoranda from Federal and State courts, U.S.
Department of Education, Level I and Level II due process hearings, tables
of cases referenced by name, issuing authority, case number, date and
citation. Other text include Special Reports issued periodically, providing
analysis of current legal topics within the special education community.
Last but certainly not least is The Year in Review providing a selection
of important judicial decisions rendered during the preceding calendar
year including summaries of each case and analysis of the most important
cases (LPR Publications, 2001).
Education of the Handicapped Act
Congress first addressed the problem of educating populations with disabilities
in 1966 when it amended the Education and Page 180 Secondary Education
Act of 1965 (Hudson v. Rowley, 1982). This act established a grant for
assisting States in the initiation, expansion, and improvement of programs
for the education of children with disabilities. The United States Congress
in 1970 initiated the Education of the Handicapped Act, P.L. 91-230 in
an effort to address concerns for the disabled sector of the population
in the United States. Since then this important Public Law has been reauthorized
a number of different times in an effort to provide necessary changes
that needed to be made. In 1975 came an important
reauthorization in the form of P. L. 94-194, (reclassified as Sec. 1400
in 1981). In 1981 the U. S. Congress made General Provision Statements
and Declarations (P.L. 91-230, amended by P.L.94-192) concerning findings
about disabled populations in the United States. These declarations, provisions
and findings have had far reaching implications for the state of disability
legislation (ADA, IDEA, P.L. 94-142) and services that exist today.
The U.S. Congress found in 1981 that there were over eight million children
with disabilities in the United States and the special education needs
of theses children were not being met. More than half of these disabled
children do not receive appropriate educational services, which would
enable them to have full equality of opportunity; and over one
million were excluded entirely from the public schools. Many children
with disabilities participating in regular school programs were prevented
from a successful experience because their disabilities were undetected;
because of the lack of services within the public schools many had to
find 5. services outside of the school system, at great distances from
there homes and at their own expense (Education of the Handicapped Act,
20 U.S.C., Sec.1400).
Congress decided that developmental training of teachers, diagnostic
methods and procedures had advanced to the degree, given the appropriate
funding, state and local educational agencies can and will provide special
education and related services to meet the needs of children with disabilities.
State and local education systems have the responsibility to provide education
for all children with disabilities, but the financial resources are inadequate
to meet the need of disabled children in special education. Congress states,
that it is in the National interest that the Federal Government assists
state and local efforts to provide programs to meet the needs of children
with disabilities in order to assure protection of the law (Education
of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C., Sec.1400).
The purpose of this chapter is to assure that all disabled children have
available to them, a Free and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) with
emphasis on special education and related services designed to meet their
unique needs, that assure the rights of children with disabilities and
their parents or guardians are protected and provide an education for
all children with disabilities, and to assess and assure the effectiveness
of efforts to educate the disabled (P.L. 91-230, Title IV, Sec. 601, reclassified
as section 1400 in 1981, Education of the handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. Sec.
1400).
In 1997 Congress passed amendments to IDEA, mandating for the first time
that states provide data on race and ethnicity of special needs students.
The data revealed a disproportionate representation of minorities among
students with disabilities. Approximately half of all students with disabilities
in 2003-2004 spent 80 percent or more of their 6. day in regular classrooms.
Black students with disabilities spend less time in a regular classroom
than non-black students. Additionally changes have occurred between 1994-1995
and 2003-2004 in the percentages of time disabled students ages 6-21 spent
in regular classroom versus other settings. Between 1994 and 2004, the
percentage of students with disabilities spending 80 percent or more time
in the regular classroom increased from 45 to 50 percent (U.S. Department
of Education, 2005).
In Tracing the Evolution of Inclusion Law, Sharp and Pitasky, (2002),
identify the 1980;s as the birth of inclusion. They express how the judiciary
has played a major role in shaping the course of inclusion law. Cases
from the 1980’s indicate that the early inclusion decisions placed
great emphasis on individual needs and frequently concluded that they
were not compatible with the regular education environment. Below review
several cases that support this, however some of these decision were over
turned at a later time.
In the case of a disabled child and citing a lack of significant progress
over an 18 month period, Roncker v. Walter, (1981), a school district
proposed to move a child classified as having mental retardation, "Trainable"
level, from a separate class for students with disabilities operated in
a public school to a class for students with disabilities operated by
the County Board of Mental Retardation. The student would receive no contact
with non-disabled children. The district court refused to intervene. On
appeal, the 6th circuit court ruled that in deciding whether placement
in a segregated institution met the mainstreaming requirement of the IDEA,
the district court should first determine whether services which made
that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated
setting. The district court’s judgment was vacated and remanded
for further proceedings. The Ronker v. Walter, case is significant as
it introduced the "feasibility" test concerning how services
may best be provided.
W. by NX v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., (1987), the district's
proposal to place a child with Down syndrome, severe mental disability,
and minimal self care abilities at a state school attended only by students
with disabilities. The court ruled that the LRE did not require the student
to be educated in a local school district where the district would have
to employ a certified teacher of students with severe disabilities to
provide FAPE, and the student would receive minimal benefit from a local
school placement.
In another case of a young child with Down syndrome, Daniel R.R.
v. El Paso Independent Sch. Dist., (1989), the court upheld the
school district's proposal to remove the child from a pre-kindergarten
class and place him in a special education class. While in a regular classroom
the teacher had to spend an inordinate amount of time focusing on the
student, to the detriment of the other students. It was decided that schools
must accommodate students with disabilities in the regular classroom that
amount to more than "Token Gestures" it is not required to modify
its curriculum to the degree that the student is excused from learning
the skills taught in the regular classroom.
Although Daniel R.R.v. El Paso, struck down the regular
classroom as the LRE, it later served as one of the chief decisions that
laid down the framework for a number of pro-inclusion cases that followed
in the 1990s. In a number of later court decisions a two part test was
applied for determining the appropriateness of placement in the LRE. At
a later time, in Daniel R.R. v. El Paso, the Fifth Circuit Court derived
from the language and applied this two part test. First the court must
determine "whether education in the regular classroom, with the use
of supplementary aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily."
Second, if the court finds that placement outside of a regular classroom
is necessary for the child to benefit educationally, then it must be decided
"whether the school has mainstreamed to the child to the maximum
extent appropriate."
For example, has the school made efforts to include the child in school
programs with children without disabilities whenever possible? The two
part test seems to follow IDEA'S directive that children with disabilities
are educated with non-disabled children "to the maximum extent appropriate."
In addition to IDEA'S requirement that schools provide individualized
programs to account for each child's specific needs Liscio v.
Woodland Hills Dist., (1989).
The early 1990s, with society's growing political consciousness of the
rights of individuals with disabilities, inclusion took center stage in
Washington (Sharp & Pitasky, 2002) with the media close at hand. The
disparity of issues in cases reported in 1991 suggests that Education
of the Handicapped Act, (P. L. 94-142) had succeeded in altering our society's
approach to educating children with special needs (McKee & Barber,
1991). The premise that children with disabilities require individualized
programs based on their needs seems to be accepted, and the most recent
court cases tend to focus on the means to achieve this goal (McKee &
Barber, 1991). A renewed interest in educational reform has resulted in
a call for parental choice in education placement and sparked new debate
over public funding of parochial schools. We have also had an increase
in the challenges made under alternative legal theories by integrating
special education law with constitutional law, civil rights litigation
and the common law of negligence.
In Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., (1992). The district
proposed placement of a child with Down syndrome in a self contained classroom
other than her neighborhood school with mainstreaming for physical education,
lunch, and music. It was determined that the district failed to adequately
consider if the student could be educated with supplementary aids and
services, or consider an alternative LRE, violated the IDEA. The district
was ordered to reconsider its placement decision.
Oberti v. Board of Education of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist.,
(1992) ranks near the top concerning inclusion pitfalls. The district
failed to make a sufficient effort at a regular education placement. Noted
was the districts shortcoming to offer any supplementary aids and services,
in particular a program of behavior management. The Oberti v. Board of
Education case was significant as a warning to school districts across
the nation. The IDEA imposes affirmative obligation on school districts
to consider placing students with disabilities in regular classroom settings,
with the use of supplemental aids and services, before exploring other
alternatives. In addition, the court recognized that special placement
could not be justified simply because a child might make improved academic
progress away from the regular educational environment.
Statum V. Birmingham Pub. Sch. Board of Education, (1993)
was the first decision credited as the first full inclusion decision to
consider the appropriateness of a regular classroom placement of a child
with severe and profound disabilities. Even though the board made significant
accommodations, including the provision of equipment, a paraprofessional
and training to the teacher and aide, the efforts were not considered
extensive enough by the court.
By the mid 1990s the courts had sufficient opportunity to evaluate the
LRE standard, understanding that the LRE does not apply to a regular education
in each and every instance. A number of cases from this time have ruled
in favor of placements other than regular education as satisfying the
LRE mandate, unique needs are the dominate theme. The LRE requirement
was part of the original law passed by Congress. It was not until the
80’s that the debate came to the forefront when special education
community began to review what the requirement really meant. The LRE may
be considered a "late Bloomer" (Pitasky, 1996) because it took
a considerable amount of time for the first inclusion lawsuits to make
their way into the courts and the judiciary to contribute its interpretation.
The growing fervor over inclusion spurred several national organizations
to act, including The National Association of School Board of Education,
Learning Disabilities Association of America and The American Federation
of Teachers. When combined the movement was monumental and would change
the face of LRE permanently (Pitasky, 1996, Sharp & Pitasky, 2002).
Cases dealing with mental disabilities all up held a placement other
than regular education as LRE. This seems to be at odds with the pre-exiting
inclusion cases from the 1990s. Several theories exist, but many experts
believe that regular education may not be appropriate for students with
more severe or profound disabilities. In addition they contend that as
student's age, academic concerns take precedence over social benefits.
In the late 1990s and 2000s, cases have become fact sensitive. Programming
and placement are very individualized. Decisions regarding placement and
what is the LRE for a student are now based on their own facts.
Deptford Township Sch. Dist. V. H. B. by E. B. and P. B.,
(2002) is an example of the districts proposed IEP that did not provide
a student with Autism the placement in the LRE. The district offered a
half day pre school program for disabled students, and a half day
in a regular education setting. The court decided that the district made
little attempt to accommodate the student in a regular classroom before
offering a segregated program. The court found that the district's proposed
placement was too restrictive, as the student needed to learn skills from
peers in the regular classroom setting. The student could have been educated
in a regular classroom with appropriate supplemental aids and services.
The opposite was found in Gill v, Columbia, (2002).
The parents sought a private based one-on-one instructor for a student
with Autism. The parents failed to prove that the district's program did
not provide FAPE. The student made slow progress in the district program
that provided for placement in several different instructional environments
to meet the student's needs. An Autism expert was used by the district
as a consultant. This resulted in the student receiving more one-on-one
training in the districts program. The IEP provided for at least 16 hours
of discrete training weekly. The district also adjusted the student's
communication goal to reflect those identified by the parents. It was
found that the district program offered a FAPE in the LRE.
A 17 year old student with Autism, Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd.
V. Picard, (1998) placed in a self contained classroom separate
from his high school that was close by. The school provided opportunity
for mainstreaming. The classroom contained a kitchen, bathroom, and other
rooms, they were used as part of the life skills curriculum. Given the
student's needs, and the fact that opportunity for inclusion with non-disabled
peers were provided, placement in this self contained classroom was found
to be the LRE for this student.
Some Interesting Legal Outcomes
Failure to provide a jailed student with services means a 22 year old
gets compensatory education Hester V. District of Columbia,
(2006). A Federal District court determined a student that had been incarcerated
at the age of 16, and who had entered into an agreement with his district
that was adopted by an Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) as a consent order,
did not receive services required by his IEP. The court found during a
subsequent due process hearing, the IHO decided incorrectly that the student
was not entitled to services because he had become a resident of another
state in which he was jailed. The court awarded the student five years
of compensatory education services. This means that a person's residency
does not change by the virtue of being incarcerated in another state.
The student's presence in Maryland was involuntary, and the district did
not dispute that he intended to return to the District of Columbia upon
his release. The court found that he resided in the District of Columbia
the entire time that he was incarcerated.
Certain forms of severe mental disabilities may present some unique circumstances
concerning proper educational placement. CRI DU CHAT SYNDROME ("cry
of the cat " in French) for example is a genetic disorder caused
by the loss or misplacement of genetic material from the fifth chromosome.
Kari H v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist., (1997) is an instance
of as child with a severe mental disability characterized by persistent
cat-like mewing. The districts placement in a comprehensive development
special education classroom with some mainstreaming complied with the
LRE. Considering any gains the student might experience in a fully inclusive
regular classroom would be marginal, she would have a better chance in
a setting where the students could communicate with the teacher in sign
language. The student's behavior was deemed disruptive to the regular
classroom necessitating her removal.
In another case involving Cri Du Chat Syndrome the plaintiff alleges
the defendants have failed to comply with procedural and substantive requirements
of the IDEA, Park V. Anaheim Union High School District and the
Greater Anaheim Special Education Local Plan Area, (2005). In
this case the Parks expressly challenged the compensatory award and the
denial of attorney's fees. As demonstrated in Park v. Anaheim litigation
has become more contentions and complex as regulations and other factors
have been explored.
Other instances of students with mental disabilities Hudson
v. Bloomfield Hills Pub. Sch., (1997) had similar outcomes. The
LRE was found to be at the districts only middle school with programs
for this student, as opposed to a regular placement in her neighborhood
middle school. It was determined that no amount of special services and
aids would meet the needs of the student in a regular education setting.
The student's performance at the regular school was done in isolation
completely reliant on her personal aid who supplied with her own curriculum
at the first and second grade level. The student's educational objectives
included independent living skills, and social skills that could not be
accomplished in a regular setting.
A number of court decisions suggest the importance of attempting a regular
education placement before rejecting it in favor of a more restrictive
placement. The more diligent a district’s efforts at inclusion,
the easier it is to defend it's self in the eyes of the law. Attempting
to include a student in the LRE is simply not enough. The district must
offer a good faith effort while providing sufficient supplementary aids
and services. Conversely some courts have indicated that a district is
not required to attempt a regular education before restrictive placement,
relying upon a student’s proven track record of failure over a several
year period. The district may rely on the facts offering compelling evidence
that inclusion would be unsuccessful based on some past experience in
an inclusion setting.
Conclusion
Academic and socialization considerations are all important when deciding
the LRE for a student with disabilities. No magic formula exists in striking
a balance between the two. A warning may be raised if a student is not
receiving any academic benefit from an inclusive placement and only a
social benefit. In addition if a student's personal program of instruction
leaves the student in isolation, the social benefits would be questionable.
Authors (Pitasky, 1996; Sharp & Pitasky, 2002) contend that the evolution
of inclusion may be best described as a period of strong pro-inclusion
in the early 1990s, placed in between equally weighty authority opposing
regular education, followed by cases decided in the new millennium in
which placement decisions are highly dependant on the individual facts
of the case. Pro-inclusion, opposition to regular education and consideration
of individual factors has contributed to the fluctuation in decisions
concerning inclusion. Norlin (2003), reports that Federal Circuit Courts
are still frequently called upon to rule on IEP disputes, addressing issues
concerning IEP meetings and behavioral management techniques. Attorney's
fees and reimbursement questions remain in the legal limelight. FAPE claims
including questions over methodology, location of services, LRE, stay
put and extended school year programs continue to be litigated.
Congress reauthorized IDEA in 1975 and it is still considered a young
law. The process of interpreting IDEA has been a slow and deliberate one.
The intent of congress is to enable disabled individuals to have full
equality of opportunity. Each inclusion case has its own unique aspects.
Individual needs must be considered when dealing with the issues of FAPE
and LRE. A direct correlation exists between the facts of the case and
its ultimate outcome. The LRE law can have slippery concepts and districts
must select their strategies wisely as the appropriateness of inclusion
depends on the details involved. A number of issues have influenced the
current state of inclusion. Perhaps the most accurate description of the
state of inclusion may be one of a “mixed bag” with support
for and against regular education placement. The inclusion dilemma is
not one of a black and white resolution. Districts must base their decisions
with a flexible approach weighing all of the relevant factors in dealing
with disabled populations (Sharp & Pitasky, 2002).
References
Daniel R.R. v. El Paso Independent Sch. Dist.,
874 F.2d 1036; 1989 U. S. App. (5th Cir.).
Deptford Township Sch. Dist. V. H. B.
by E. B. and P. B. , 36 IDELR 94 (D. N. J. 2002).
Education of the Handicapped Act, (20 U.S.C.,
Sec.1400-1485).
LPR Publications, 1989.
Gill v, Columbia 93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.
1027; 1999 US App. (8th Cir.).
Hester v. District of Columbia., 433 F. Supp.
2d 71; 2006 (Columbia Dist. Ct.).
Hudson v. Bloomfield Hills Pub. Sch.,
108 F.3d 112; 1997 US App. (6th Cir.).
Hudson Dist. BD. OF ED. v. Rowley., 458
U.S. 176, 1982.
Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Reporter,
(2001). Introduction to the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Law Report, LPR Publications .
Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report,
Volume 45, #9. June, 2006, LPR Publications.
Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd. V. Picard.,
27 IDELR 824 (Ed. La. 1998).
Kari H v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist.,
26 IDELR 569 (6th Cir. 1997).
Liscio v. Woodland Hills Dist., 734 F.
Supp. 689; 1989 (W. D. Pa.).
McKee, P. W. & Barber R. H., (1991). Review
of Special Education Cases. Individuals with Disability Education Law
Report. LPR Publications.
Norlin, J. W. (2003). The Year in Review.
Individuals with Disability Law Report. LPR Publications.
Oberti v. Board of Education of Borough of
Clementon Sch. Dist., 19 IDELR 908,914 (3rd Cir. 1993).
Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch., Dist.,
31 F.3d 1489, 1496-97; 1994 U.S. App. (9th Cir.)
Park v. Anaheim Union High School District
and the Greater Anaheim Special Education Local Plan Area., 444 F.3d
1149; 2006 U.S. App. (9th Cir.).
Pitasky, V. M. (1996). The Current Legal Status
Of Inclusion. IDLR Special Report No. 15, LPR Publications.
Roncker v. Walter., 553 IDLER 121 (6th
Cir. 1983).
Sharp, G.K. & Pitasky, V. M. (2002). The Current
Legal Status of Inclusion. Individuals With Disability Law Report, Special
Report No. 29, LPR Publications.
Statum V. Birmingham Pub. Sch. Board of Education.,
20 IDELR 435 (N. D. Ala. 1993).
U. S. Department of Education, National Center
for Education Statistics, (2005). The Condition of Education 2005. NCES
2005-094. Washington, DC: US Government printing Office.
W. by NX v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist.,
558 IDELR 294 (E. D. Mo. 1987).
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